The consolidation of the digital economy has profoundly transformed how children and adolescents socialize, consume, and access information. Digital platforms, social networks, games, and streaming services now occupy a central position in young people's lives, while business models have become heavily dependent on the collection and economic exploitation of personal data. This has created significant risks tied to the commercial exploitation of minors' cognitive and emotional vulnerability.
Background
The protection of children in advertising is not a new issue in Brazil. The Brazilian Code of Advertising Self-Regulation[1], developed by the National Council for Advertising Self-Regulation ("CONAR"), has long established ethical guidelines for commercial communications aimed at young audiences. Additionally, Resolution No. 163/2014 of the National Council for the Rights of Children and Adolescents ("CONANDA")[2] classified advertising directed at children up to twelve years of age as abusive, and in 2021 CONAR published, in partnership with Google and the São Paulo Public Prosecutor's Office, a Guide to Best Practices for Online Advertising Aimed at Children[3]. These instruments emphasize the recognition of children as developing persons requiring reinforced protection, the need for parental supervision in digital activities, and strict observance of Brazil's General Data Protection Law ("LGPD", Law No. 13,709/2018)[4].
However, this self-regulatory framework historically focused on the content and messaging of advertisements — not on the underlying data infrastructure. There was no direct regulation of the collection and use of personal data for algorithmic segmentation or behavioral profiling — a critical gap in the digital environment, where advertising operates less through explicit persuasion and more through the invisible modulation of behaviors based on massive data analysis.
The Digital ECA: A Structural Shift
The full entry into force of the Digital Statute for Children and Adolescents (Law No. 15,211/2025, or "Digital ECA")[5], on March 17, 2026, marks a decisive regulatory turning point. The economic exploitation of minors' personal data moves from a gray zone of technical permissiveness to being rigidly delimited by legal obligations of age verification, data minimization, and reinforced privacy protection.
Unlike previous initiatives that sought to mitigate abuses or impose ex post accountability, the Digital ECA acts on the structural layer of the data economy. The turning point lies in two central normative axes: rigorous age verification mechanisms and the strict application of personal data minimization. The law also redefines the distribution of responsibilities along the digital chain: under Article 15, all actors — platforms, advertisers, agencies, and intermediaries — become jointly and severally liable for the comprehensive protection of children and adolescents.
By shifting the focus from content to data infrastructure, the Digital ECA overcomes the self-regulatory model and establishes a binding legal regime with severe administrative sanctions and state oversight. The National Data Protection Agency ("ANPD") has reinforced this approach through preliminary guidelines emphasizing proportionality, necessity, and data minimization in the implementation of age verification mechanisms[6].
Notably, digital products and services originally designed for adult audiences, but susceptible to probable access by minors, also fall within the scope of the Digital ECA, significantly expanding the reach of its obligations. Furthermore, implementing Decree No. 12,880/2026[7] extends regulation beyond data processing to the "choice architecture" of digital environments, converting design elements and user experience into direct objects of regulation. Products and services must prevent excessive or compulsive use, and manipulative, deceptive, or coercive practices are expressly prohibited — bringing Brazilian law squarely in line with international discussions on "dark patterns."
Age Verification Mechanisms
The Digital ECA requires reliable age verification mechanisms and expressly prohibits self-declaration, breaking with the model historically adopted by the digital industry. From 2026 onward, ignorance of a user's age ceases to be legally acceptable[8]. The duty to know — whether through age signals, APIs, or interoperable mechanisms — becomes part of the inherent risk of digital economic activity. Platforms, advertisers, and intermediaries are now responsible not only for the content they display but also for the legal adequacy of their data practices to the age of the audience reached.
The law does not mandate a single verification model. It admits different technical solutions proportional to the risk of the service, opening space for multi-layered approaches, including algorithmic age estimation, documentary verification, and minimum attribute verification mechanisms such as verifiable credentials and zero-knowledge proofs. The ANPD's guidelines reinforce this risk-based proportionality, rejecting excessively intrusive solutions in low-impact contexts and reserving more robust mechanisms for potentially harmful digital environments.[9]
The Digital ECA also envisions a decentralized architecture in which operating systems, app stores, and other infrastructure agents play a central role in operationalizing age signals, parental controls, and interoperable governance mechanisms. The regulatory debate thus shifts from documentary validation to a systemic logic of digital age governance, with profound effects on how personal data is collected, used, and shared. Regulatory risk becomes embedded in the economic logic of the sector, influencing design, investment, and innovation decisions.
Profiling
Under Digital ECA, the traditional logic of digital advertising — behavioral profiling and engagement maximization — becomes legally incompatible with the processing of children's and adolescents' data. Profiling is broadly defined to comprise any form of data processing, automated or not, aimed at classifying individuals into groups or profiles to generate inferences about behavior, preferences, consumption habits, or similar attributes. This breadth is intentional: the definition captures not only data provided directly by minors but also inferred data derived from the behavior of adults in the same household or from shared device usage patterns.
Article 22 unequivocally prohibits advertising targeting and adolescents based on profiling, emotional analysis, augmented reality, extended reality, and virtual reality. This prohibition may also extend, by interpretation, to profiling supported by inferences, group data, or information obtained during age verification. Individualized targeting ("microtargeting") — based on browsing habits, consumption patterns, or engagement metrics — becomes incompatible with the new regime, regardless of the degree of technological sophistication employed. This is not a technical limitation but a deliberate normative choice.
The ANPD has reinforced this position, confirming that digital services cannot collect or exploit personal data of children and adolescents for personalized behavioral advertising.[10] The focus shifts from the individual to the context: contextual advertising — based on the environment, the content accessed, or content ratings — becomes the only legally safe avenue for commercial communication directed at minors. This transition is not economically neutral, as it reduces the predictive capacity of advertisements, challenges traditional performance metrics, and requires new parameters for evaluating return on investment.
Loot Boxes and Other Engagement Mechanisms
Article 20 of the Digital ECA prohibits loot boxes in electronic games — virtual boxes whose contents are revealed only after purchase, operating on a random reward logic similar to gambling. These mechanics exploit the cognitive vulnerability of young users, who have a lesser capacity to evaluate probabilities and resist behavioral stimuli designed to maximize engagement.
The prohibition extends beyond direct financial transactions to encompass virtual currency systems that mask the real monetary value of purchases and hinder parental control. By incorporating this prohibition, Brazil aligns with a growing international protective trend and moves beyond traditional industry self-regulation.
The Digital ECA's reach should also encompass other artificial engagement mechanisms, such as streak systems that penalize absences, persistent push notifications, and timers designed to induce impulsive purchases. The framework recognizes that the core problem is not any single mechanism, but a model structured to maximize continuous engagement at the expense of children's well-being. The digital environment for young audiences must be guided by the best interest of the child, not by revenue maximization.
Privacy-by-Design
The Digital ECA fundamentally alters the role of marketing within digital product architecture. By mandating privacy-by-design and privacy-by-default, the law requires advertising strategies to be conceived from the product's inception, not added as a subsequent monetization layer. Operationally, this translates into rigorous obligations of data minimization and temporal limitation, including the prohibition of storing documents used for age verification and the immediate and irreversible deletion of such information after extraction of the necessary attribute (Art. 24 of Decree No. 12,880/2026).
The ANPD has been designated, under Decree No. 12,622/2025[11], as the autonomous administrative authority for protecting children and adolescents in digital environments, assuming a strategic role in complementary regulation, technical standards, and sanctions enforcement.
Transparency now assumes a strategic dimension. Companies must demonstrate, in a documented and auditable manner, that their marketing strategies respect the principles of purpose, necessity, and adequacy. Data Protection Impact Reports ("DPIA"), design decision documentation, and internal governance mechanisms become central instruments of regulatory defense. In 2026, privacy-by-design ceases to be an abstract best practice and operates as a normative criterion of legality: the absence of technical safeguards or excessive data collection constitutes potential administrative infringements subject to severe sanctions. Compliance must be concretely demonstrated, not merely presumed.
Enforcement
The Digital ECA consolidates a new regulatory paradigm in which the attention economy, when directed at young audiences, is legally conditioned by principles of dignity, healthy development, and informational self-determination. Protecting vulnerable audiences is no longer an ethical choice, it is a requirement for legal survival in the Brazilian digital market.
Sanctions for non-compliance are significant: warnings with deadlines for corrective measures; fines of up to 10% of the economic group's revenue in Brazil, capped at R$50 million (approximately USD 9 million) per infraction; temporary suspension of activities; and, ultimately, prohibition of operations. Where a company has no revenue in its last fiscal year, per-user fines of R$10.00 to R$1,000.00 may be imposed, also capped at R$50 million per infraction.
Beyond pecuniary sanctions, the law incorporates structural measures — including the authority to direct telecommunications providers, traffic exchange points, and domain name resolution services to block access to the sanctioned application or service. This creates an enforcement model that does not depend exclusively on direct coercion over the economic agent but can be operationalized through the internet infrastructure itself.
Conclusion
The Digital ECA represents a regulatory turning point: digital marketing in Brazil must abandon practices based on the exploitation of personal data and rebuild itself under the logic of proportionality, transparency, and fundamental rights protection. The law shifts the axis of digital advertising from content to infrastructure, from explicit persuasion to data governance, and from self-regulation to a binding legal regime with effective oversight and sanctioning mechanisms. For international companies operating in or targeting the Brazilian market, understanding and adapting to this new framework is no longer optional — it is a legal imperative.
[1] Brazilian Advertising Self-Regulation Council (CONAR), Brazilian Advertising Self-Regulation Code. Available at: http://www.conar.org.br/
[2] National Council for the Rights of Children and Adolescents (CONANDA), Resolution No. 163 (Mar. 13, 2014). Available at: https://www.gov.br/mdh/pt-br/acesso-a-informacao/participacao-social/conselho-nacional-dos-direitos-da-crianca-e-do-adolescente-conanda/resolucoes/resolucao-163-_publicidade-infantil.pdf
[3] CONAR; Google; Public Prosecutor’s Office of the State of São Paulo, Guide to Good Practices for Online Advertising Directed at Children (2021). Available at: http://www.conar.org.br/
[4] Brazilian General Data Protection Law (LGPD), Law No. 13,709 (Aug. 14, 2018). Available at: https://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_ato2015-2018/2018/lei/L13709.htm
[5] Digital Child and Adolescent Statute (Digital ECA), Law No. 15,211 (Sept. 17, 2025). Available at: https://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_ato2023-2026/2025/lei/L15211.htm
[6] Brazilian Data Protection Authority (ANPD), Reliable Age Verification Mechanisms – Preliminary Guidance, at 4–5: “At the outset, it should be noted that the Digital ECA adopts a regulatory model oriented toward risk prevention and the comprehensive protection of children and adolescents in the digital environment. This guideline is reflected, for example, in Article 3, which establishes that information technology products and services directed at this audience, or likely to be accessed by them, must adopt appropriate and proportionate measures to ensure a high level of privacy, data protection, and security, taking the best interests of the child and adolescent as a benchmark.”
[7] Decree No. 12,880 (Mar. 18, 2026), regulating Law No. 15,211/2025 and establishing the National Policy for the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Children and Adolescents in the Digital Environment. Available at: https://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_ato2023-2026/2026/Decreto/D12880.htm
[8] Brazilian Data Protection Authority (ANPD), Reliable Age Verification Mechanisms – Preliminary Guidance, at 12: “In this regard, solutions based exclusively on user self-declaration have a low level of reliability, as they depend on easily manipulated information and lack independent and trustworthy data sources.”
[9] Brazilian Data Protection Authority (ANPD), Reliable Age Verification Mechanisms – Preliminary Guidance, at 7: “Based on this regulatory model, Article 24(I) of the Decree incorporates a risk-based approach into the specific context of age verification solutions, establishing that they must observe ‘proportionality between the solution adopted and the level of risk associated with the service.’”
[10] Brazilian Data Protection Authority (ANPD), Reliable Age Verification Mechanisms – Preliminary Guidance, at 15: “This same logic is reinforced by Article 37, sole paragraph, which establishes that the regulation of the Digital ECA by the Executive Branch may not, under any circumstances, impose, authorize, or result in the implementation of mass, generalized, or indiscriminate surveillance mechanisms, nor practices that compromise fundamental rights such as freedom of expression, privacy, comprehensive protection, and the differentiated treatment of children’s and adolescents’ personal data, in accordance with the Federal Constitution, the Child and Adolescent Statute, and the LGPD.”
[11] Decree No. 12,622 (Sept. 17, 2025), designating the Brazilian Data Protection Authority (ANPD) as the autonomous administrative authority responsible for protecting children and adolescents in digital environments and regulating Law No. 15,211/2025. Available at: https://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_ato2023-2026/2025/decreto/d12622.htm

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